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Replevin

Broward Ordinance and Replevin

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The Broward County Ordinance and Replevin

pawhand

Judge Requests Rehearing of Replevin Motion in Brandie's Case

It is my understanding that the Judge in Brandie's case has requested to Rehear the Lipsky Motion for Replevin.  I think the judge needed time to understand the notion and procedure of a Writ of Replevin, and now wants to hear how this Writ applies to Brandie and the Broward County Ordinance.

In order to understand why Brandie is entitled to be home pending appeal, let's take a look first at the State statute and the Broward County Ordinance.  They have to be read together in order to reach a proper legal conclusion.

Florida State Statute

The first crinkle is the fact that the state statute has two different procedures: one to declare a dog dangerous (F.S. § 767.12) and the other to order the destruction of a dog (F.S. § 767.13). The problem is, that these two procedures require different definitions of the dog's act. To declare a dog dangerous under 767.12 the dog either has to have more than once killed a domestic animal, scared someone or aggresively  bitten or inflicted severe injury on a human being.  To order destruction of a dog under F.S § 767.13, the dog has to either been previously declared dangerous and attacked or bitten a person or domestic animal or if not previously declared dangerous causing severe injury or death to a human. Confused yet?

Dangerous dog track

The state statute discusses an appeal from the lower tribunal (hearing officer) differently depending on which procedure is being considered. Thus, if you are under the dangerous dog track, F.S. § 767.12(d)  says the owner "must confine the dog in a securely fenced or enclosed area pending resolution of the appeal.

Destruction of dog track

If you are under the destruction of dog track, F.S. § 767.13(1) or (2)  the statute says "The owner shall be responsible for payment of all boarding costs and other fees as may be required to humanely and safely keep the animal during any appeal procedure."

The State statute thus makes sense-if the dog is on the dangerous dog track the dog stays home pending appeal.  If the dog is on the destruction of dog track (defined as previously declared dangerous and attacked or bitten a person-or if not declared dangerous causing severe injury to human) animal control keeps the dog.

Broward County Ordinance

Now let's take a look at the Broward County Ordinance.

The first thing you notice, is that there are not two different procedural tracks in the headings of the Ordinance. They are there, however, and the same division is made with respect to the action of the dog.

Dangerous dog track

The dangerous dog track is contained in Section 4-12 (b) and (c). Under the dangerous dog track, 4-12(c) the ordinance says that upon appeal of the initial animal control decision (an appeal to the hearing officer) the owner will "confine the dog in a securely fenced area pending resolution of the appeal." Section 4-12(d) and working under the dangerous dog track, animal control must determine that the owner is unwilling or unable to securely confine the dog before it impounds it.  With respect to appeal from the hearing officer's decision, section 4-12(d) says that if the dog is subsequently classified as dangerous, the dog shall remain impounded until the owner provides secure confinement in accordance with this section. Thus, on appeal, the owner would continue to keep the dog at home, unless animal control makes a determination that the owner is unable to keep the dog in a securely fenced area pending appeal.

Destruction of dog track

The destruction of dog track is contained 4-12(j) and defines a dog eligible for destruction if it was previously declared dangerous and causes severe injury to or death of a human or causes death of a domestic animal. If the dog has not previously declared dangerous and causes severe injury or death of a human being or causes the death of a domestic animal. Note the definition is exactly the same whether the dog has previously been declared dangerous or not (which makes no sense whatsoever-note there is a difference under the State statute). Under the destruction of dog track, animal control impounds the dog.  There is nothing further under this section about what happens on appeal. Note that the state statute is clear regarding this issue-the dog is kept by Animal Control.  Either Broward forgot to put this in, or intentionally left it out.

Discussion

Because the Broward County Ordinance does not complete the destruction of dog track to include what happens to the dog on appeal, it is clearly arguable that all of the provisions of the Dangerous Dog track apply.  That is, that the owner shall keep the dog during appeal unless Animal Control decides the owner is unable or unwilling to confine the dog in a securely fenced area pending resolution of appeal. In addition, since the state statute was not followed in the Broward Ordinance, the only conclusion is that they knew it was there but intentionally left it out. The other problem is that in making the one kill rule, the Ordinance makes no distinction on what the dog did-the penalty is the same whether the dog was previously declared dangerous or not. If that is the case, why even make such a distinction?

Complicated.

 

Last Updated on Tuesday, 03 August 2010 15:11
 

Replevin Case Law

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Replevin Case Law

pawhand

Case law varies from state to state on the Replevin issue. However, there is so little of it that relates to Dangerous Dog litigation, that it is imperative to know what's out there and helpful to your cause.  Below are cases I have found helpful in Dangerous Dog cases.

Replevin is Proper Cause of Action Against Government Taking

Sammeth v. City of Seattle, (Case No. 07-32889) - Unreported - In this §1983 case, a Writ of Replevin was filed and sucessful in getting the dog back pending appeal.  This is clear in the Amended Complaint that can be seen here.

Thomas v. City of Minneapolis, 2007 WL 1121465 (Minn. App. 2007) - This case involves a dog that got lost and was picked up by Animal Control and then given to Underdog Rescue.  It was then transferred to a third party. The owner sued Animal Control and the Rescue entity in Replevin and for monetary damages. After Thomas found out who had adopted the dog, she named them as defendant.  At summary judgement, the court granted Thomas' Replevin Motion. The rest of the opinion is really irrelevant, as it discusses improper granting of sactions. 

Rabon v. City of Seattle, 34 P.3d 821 (Wash. App. 2001) - Not a part of the legal argument, but it is clear in the court decision that Rabon filed a Writ of Replevin against Seattle Animal Control who agreed to return his dogs with conditions. Id. at 823. 

Helmy v. Swigert, 662 So.2d 395 (5th DCA 1995) - This case is slighly off topic because it involves a Writ of Mandamus to return a dog that was seized during a criminal case for evidence.  However, it is from Florida, and it does illustrate the concept of due process in a seizure. The court granted the owners' Writ of Mandamus and directed the trial court to have an evidentiary hearing on the conflicting ownership claims, since the dog had been transferred to the Humane Society.

Studer v. Seneca County Humane Society, 2000 WL 566738 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 2000) - After seizing animals due to neglect, the owner filed a Writ of Replevin for return.  The court reversed dismissal of the owner's replevin claim, and noted that there was no proof that the animals that were the subject of the Writ were tho ones that were involved in the neglect proceedings. 

Dog is Proper Subject of Replevin

In addition to the cases above, the following decisions have found that a dog is the proper subject of a Replevin action.

Webb v. Papaspiridakos, 2009 NY Slip Op 51152 (S.Ct. Queens Cty 2009) - Replevin to recover dog that was transferred to third party without consent of owner.

Borrayo v. Lefever, 159 P.3d 657 (Col. App 2006) - Replevin of dog after termination of nonmarital relationship.

Angrave v. Oates, 876 A2d 1287 (CT App 2005) - Replevin of a show dog after owner transferred for care in exchange for giving the defendant puppies from the dog's first litter.

Bono v. McCutcheon, 2005 Ohio 299 (2nd Dist . OH 2005) - Replevin of Whippet Puppy on the basis it would be shown.

Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630 (S.Ct. Vermont 1997) - Replevin of Morgan's dog after it was lost and found by Kroupa.

Buczkowicz v. Lubin, 399 N.E. 2d 680 (Ill. App. 3rd Dict. 1980) - Replevin of dog who had been transferred for the purpose of showing. 

 

Last Updated on Tuesday, 03 August 2010 15:12
 

Replevin Value Allegation

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Replevin Value Allegation

pawhand

The value allegation in the Replevin complaint is important.  It is from this allegation the court decides what bond the government will have to post if they decide they want to keep the dog.  Unfortunately, in Florida, dogs are property, and as a result, the government will argue that the value of the dog is simply the fair market value.  Unless a dog is a show dog or service dog, it is difficult to ethically allege any substantial value to the dog.

Instead, argue intrinsic value.  Have the owner calculate how much they have spent on the dog, for food, shelter and medical care. Add in the legal expenses that have been spent and the client is going to spend to save the dog.  Prepare an affidavit attesting to the value of the dog and have it ready for the hearing if you need it. If the government does not show an interest in keeping the dog, you won't need it. The judge may or may not agree with this theory, but it is the best you can do.

I could only find one case that discusses this issue, and only in the context of breach of an oral agreement to return a dog to a nonmarital partner:

Houseman v. Dare, 966 A2d 24 (N.J. Sup. Ct 2009) - The court held that specific performance was the appropriate remedy, because a dog has subjective and intrinsic value to the owner. The court cited Hyland v. Borras, 719 A.2d 662 (N.J. App. Div. 1998) where an owner was allowed to recover the costs of treatment exceeding replacement value, and Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997).

Florida Cases supporting Intrinsic Value

Levine v. Knowles, 197 So2d 329 (3rd DCA 1967), the court stated: “It would appear, therefore, that an owner has the same right of action to recover compensatory damages for the intrinsic value, if any, of a dead dog wrongfully destroyed, that he would have for any other property wrongfully destroyed.”  (Emphasis added.) Id. at 331.  Thus, Florida law governing the concept of intrinsic value is relevant.

First National Bank v. Mackenzie, 131 So. 790, 791 (S. Ct. 1931) - Courts have long recognized that personal property can have a value to the owner greater than fair market value.  This is particularly true when the property “(i)s of such peculiar and intrinsic value to the owner that its loss cannot be compensated adequately in damages.”   

Florida Public Utilities v. Wester, 7 So2d 788 (S.Ct. 1942) - In trying to value family heirlooms that had been destroyed, the court said, “In fact, it may be very valuable so far as the owner is concerned, but have no value so far as the public is concerned. It would be manifestly unfair to apply the test of market value in such cases.  Id. at 382. 

Reynolds v. Towne Management, 426 So2d 1011 (2nd DCA 1983) - The court cited with approval Florida Public Utilities, supra, and upheld plaintiffs evaluation of the worth of her property saying, “The trial judge, we think, was correct in receiving plaintiff’s testimony because where personal effects have been destroyed the court must apply a test that will allow such evidence of value as will enable a jury to reasonable compensate the person wronged. Id. at 1013.  

Christopher Advertising v. R & B, 883 So2d 867, 871 (3rd DCA 2004) - The Third District stated, “A person tortiously deprived of property is entitled to damages based upon its special value to him if that is greater than its market value.” The court again cited to Florida Public Utilities, supra, with approval.   They also cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 927, comment c.

Wertman v. Tipping, 166 So.2d 666 (1st DCA 1964) - Court declined to apply the fair market value of a pet and held that recovery could include special or pecuniary value to the owner.

Cases discussing Intrinsic value for death of a pet

Small Dog Rescue v. McKenney, SOM-L864-04 (N.J. Superior 2004) - In denying a Motion to Dismiss, Judge Ashrafi stated “In this case the Court concludes that the plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove damages other than the alleged market value of Baxter, that is the intrinsic value of Baxter to them…” Id. 

Is There Such a Thing as Veterinarian Malpractice, 45 New Jersey Lawyer, August 2005.

Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1979) - The court held that the concept of actual value to the owner obviously includes some element of sentiment…” Id. at 1311. 

Brouseau v. Rosenthal, 443 NYS2nd 285 (N.Y.Civ.Ct. 1980) - The court allowed recovery for the actual value to the dog’s owner since the dog had no ascertainable market value.

Jankowski v. Preiser, 510 NE2d 1084 (1st Dist Ill. 1987) - In a veterinarian malpractice case, the court held that the damages to be applied to a dog who had died as a result of defendant’s negligence, was the dog’s actual value to the owner, including sentimental value, citng with approval to Mieske, supra.

Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 NE 2nd 472 (1st Dist Ill 2005) - Cited with approval Jankowski, supra, and affirmed the “value to the owner” computation of damages.

Bluestone v. Bergstrom, No. 00CC00796 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Orange C0. 2003) -  Upholding a judgment of $39,000 which included special or unique value damages.

In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 NYU L. Rev. 1059, 1081-1083  (1995) - Also confirms the concept of intrinsic value.

Determining the Value of Companion Animals in Wrongful Harm or Death Claims - A Survey of U.S. Decisions And An Argument for the Authorization To Recover For The Loss of Companionship in Such Cases, Michigan State University College of Law 2007 by Marcella S. Roukas. 

Florida cases discussing a companion animal AS MORE THAN PROPERTY

La Porte v. Associated Independents, 163 So2d 267, 269 (Fla.S.Ct. 1964) - Florida has long recognized that a pet is more than mere property. “(T)he affection  of a master for his dog is a very real thing and…the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal.” 

Paul v. Oseola County, 388 So2d 40 (5th DCA 1980) - “(W)e are mindful that anyone who has enjoyed the companionship and affection of a pet will often spend far in excess of any possible market value to maintain or prolong its life, therefore the motive for redress is equally strong.” Id

other jurisdictions discussing a companion animal as more than property

Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A2nd 630, 633 (1997) - “(A) dog is an inherently social creature whose value derives from the animal’s relationship with its human companions.” In a concurring opinion, the learned Judge Andell aptly stated:

Many people who love and admire dogs as family members do so because of the traits the dogs often embody. These represent some of the best human traits including loyalty, trust, courage, playfulness and love. This cannot be said of inanimate property. At the same time, dogs typically lack the worst human traits, including avarice, apathy, pettiness and hatred…..We now know that mammals share with us a great many emotive and cognitive characteristics, and that the higher primates are very similar to humans neurologically and genetically….Society has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian view that animals are unfeeling automatons and hence mere property…The law should reflect society’s recognition that animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing companionship to the humans with whom they live…..(A) great number of people in this country today treat their pets as family members. Indeed for many people, pets are the only family members they have. Losing a beloved pet is not the same as losing an inanimate object, however cherished it might be. Even an heirloom of great sentimental value, if lost, does not constitute a loss comparable to that of a living being. This distinction applies even though the deceased in a nonhuman living being. 

Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 SW2d 368, 377 (Tex.Ct.App. 1994). 

Seidner v. Dill, 206 NE2d 636 (App.Ct.Ind. 1965) - The court referred to some literary descriptions of dogs:

The best human friend a man has in the world may turn against him and become his enemy. His son or daughter that he has reared with loving care may prove ungrateful. Those who are nearest and dearest to us, those whom we trust with our happiness and our good name may become traitors to their faith. The money that a man has he may lose. It flies away from him, perhaps, when he needs it most. A man’s reputation may be sacrificed in a moment of ill-considered action. The people who are prone to fall on their knees to do us honor when success is with us may be the first to throw the stone of malice when failure settles its cloud upon our heads. 

The one absolutely unselfish friend that a man can have in this selfish world, the one that never deceives him, the one that never proves ungrateful and treacherous, is his dog.  A man’s dog stands by him in prosperity and in poverty, in health and in sickness. He will sleep on the cold ground where the wintry wind blows and the snow drifts fiercely, if only he may be near his master’s side. He will kiss the hand that has no food to offer. He will lick the wounds and sores that come in encounter with the roughness of the world. He guards the sleep of his pauper master as if he were a prince. When all other friends desert, he remains. When riches take wings and reputation falls to pieces, he is as constant in his love as the sun in its journey through the heavens….When death takes the master….there by the graveside may the noble dog be found, his head between his paws, his eyes sad but open in alert watchfulness, faithful and true even in death. Id. at 647. 

Last Updated on Saturday, 07 August 2010 23:15
 

Replevin Procedure

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Replevin Procedure

pawhand

Replevin is a statutorily defined action and is contained in F.S. § 78.  There is even a form Replevin Writ contained in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 

In drafting your complaint, a very important allegation is the value of the dog. Such an allegation must be made in good faith. The reason it is important, is that it is this allegation that triggers the bond the Defendant must file if it intends to keep the dog despite the judge ruling that you have the right to do so.  Unfortunately, most dogs do not have a high fair market value unless they are show dogs or service dogs. Thus, you either have to allege a very low fair market value in good faith, or argue that the dog has a special intrinsic value.  It is my belief that intrinsic value is the better allegation.  I have made this argument in veterinary malpractice cases.  A memorandum of law on the issue can be found here.

After you have drafted your complaint, you need to do an affidavit of your client which asserts his or her superior ownership interest.  This is called a "Further Showing" affidavit under the statute and an example of one is here. Then do a blank Order to Show Cause, leaving out the date and time of the hearing for the judge to fill in. A copy of an Order to Show Cause can be found here .

File the replevin action, but don't serve it yet.  Provide the clerk with copies of the blank Order to Show Cause, and request the clerk notify you when it is signed by the judge. 

The clerk will call you when the judge has signed the order and filled in the hearing date.  Now you serve the complaint, the further showing affidavits, and the Order to Show Cause on the Defendant(s).

The Order to Show Cause Hearing is in the nature of an evidentiary hearing, and the Defendants can call witnesses and file counter-affidavits.

Last Updated on Tuesday, 03 August 2010 15:11
 

Replevin-Get the dog back

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Replevin

pawhand

The first thing to do is get the dog back

As they say in sports, the best defense is a good offense.  Filing a Writ of Replevin when the dog is first impounded is one of the best ways to defend a dangerous dog case.

You need to get possession of the dog.  Who has the dog influences everything about the case.  Most people, after losing possession of their companion will do most anything to get it back, including just accepting the Dangerous Dog Classification and all that goes with it. And of course when that happens, you've waived any right to appeal the designation.  In Marion County, Florida, you can't even visit your dog during impoundment, which makes it even more likely that the Classification will simply be accepted.  This happens about 90% of the time in my practice, and I can't blame the owners.  Having a loved one in solitary confinement without visitation is impossible to take.  And Animal Control knows this. 

To add insult to injury, they charge you boarding fees everyday your dog is there-yet you know nothing about how it is being cared for. If the dog stays there for any length of time, you could end up owing more than all the fines and other fees combined.

The appeal could take years,  with no guarantee of sucess. If you lose you could owe thousands of dollars in boarding fees.  How is it logical to take such a course of action?  It's not. They know that.

So the only way to proceed is to file a Writ of Replevin and get possession of the dog back to your client. A Writ of Replevin forces Animal Control to go before a judge and explain why they should retain possession of the dog pending the dangerous dog litigation. The court considers who has a superior possessory right. 

The Writ of Replevin is based solely on statute in Florida, F.S. § 78.  There are some procedural requirements that you have to comply with.  You must make a demand for the dog to be returned as a condition precedent, unless such a demand would be futile. The defendant may be able to keep the dog if it posts a bond, and the bond amount is usually determined from the allegation of value in the complaint. "Further showing" affidavits must be filed as well.  An example of the "Further Showing" affidavits filed in ULU's case can be found here.  These issues will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent article.  However, you can see the Writ of Replevin I filed in ULU's case here. It changes the whole posture of the case. If the appeal takes a year, no problem. The dog is at home and boarding fees are not accruing.

SAMPLE PLEADINGs

Sammeth v. City of Seattle - Complaint 

Stefaniw v. Marion County - Writ of Replevin

RELEVANT CASE LAW

Folkers v. City of Waterloo, 582 F.Supp.2d 1141 (USDCNC Iowa 2008) - Not specifically on point, but the ordinance involved allowed the owner to keep the dog pending appeal.  Animal Control and the City Attorney disagreed on whether the dog should be given to the owner. The city council, fearing the dog would be removed voted 7-0 to keep the dog in the hands of animal control. At a later hearing, a question was raised about accrued boarding fees. Several days after that, Cleo was returned to the owner and Cleo was moved to a ranch in Texas.

 

Last Updated on Tuesday, 03 August 2010 15:11
 


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